Allies of the United States, like Poland, are watching and will need to be certain of Obama's commitment to them. At the same time, Russia surely will try to take advantage of any uncertainty. It is critical that Obama move ahead quickly on his promise to "spare no effort to protect Americans from the threats posed by nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles" that he and his vice presidential running mate, Joe Biden, made in their declaration "A Stronger Partnership with Europe for a Safer America" on Nov. 20.

In order to fulfill his fundamental commitment to protect and defend the people, territory, institutions and infrastructure of the United States and its allies, Obama will need to propose a defense program that includes a dedicated and robust ballistic missile defense enterprise. Such an enterprise should include a commitment to spend between 2 percent and 3 percent of the U.S. defense budget on ballistic missile defense.

Appropriately, Obama stated in his Nov. 12 paper "Barack Obama and Joe Biden on Defense Issues" that ballistic missile defenses must be effective and that this will require rigorous testing.

A rigorous testing program, by definition, will require robust funding. Obama cannot at the same time demand a greater volume and array of testing activities and cut the budget for these activities.

Clearly, avoiding the catastrophic effects of a ballistic missile attack on the United States with weapons of mass destruction is worth a portion of the overall defense budget that runs between 2 percent and 3 percent of the total. This commitment should come in the context of a broader defense plan that commits 4 percent of gross domestic product to defense.

The rigorous testing program Obama has called for cannot follow traditional acquisition procedures, because ballistic missile defenses constitute a complex system of systems. Traditional Department of Defense acquisition procedures require operational testing prior to procurement, but this is impossible for ballistic missile defense and a limited number of other weapons systems, because the BMD "system of systems" has to be built in order to permit testing for operational effectiveness.

(Part 3: The bright prospects of research and development in boost phase and terminal phase ballistic missile defense systems)

(Baker Spring is F.M. Kirby research fellow in national security policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies; Peter Brookes is senior fellow for national security affairs in the Davis Institute; and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is assistant director of the Davis Institute and senior research fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Allison Center at The Heritage Foundation.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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